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27 October 1961

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
(Information as of 1200 EDT 26 Oct)

SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS Page 1

The temporary Sino-Soviet truce reached in November 1960 has been shattered by developments at the 22nd party congress. The violent Soviet attacks on the Albanian regime have overshadowed the new Soviet party program and suggest that Khrushchev has chosen this issue to impose on Peiping a new test of strength in the continuing struggle for leadership of the international Communist movement. His revival of charges against the antiparty group is intended to link this issue with the "cult of personality" indictment against the Albanians--and, by implication, the Chinese--leaders. The proceedings of the congress provide further evidence that Khrushchev's position as leader of the Soviet Union is unassailable. Peiping has already indicated that it will defend Albania, but will probably urge that the matter be settled in private discussions.

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BERLIN Page 11

The USSR now appears to have placed itself firmly behind the Ulbricht regime's efforts to force US officials to acknowledge the right of East German guards at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint in East Berlin to exercise control over US-licensed vehicles driven by civilians. As recently as 22 October Soviet officials in Berlin had indicated that the USSR still accepted the US position that US official license plates are sufficient identification in so far as East German police personnel are concerned. At the Soviet party congress, bloc leaders are avoiding polemical treatment of the Berlin and German issues pending continuation of exploratory talks with the United States.

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SOUTH VIETNAM Page 15

Viet Cong activity continued at record level last week, with most incidents occurring in the southern areas. The Communists are keeping up attacks to disrupt north-south communications routes, but apparently are still concentrating on erosion of the Diem government's control at the village level. Continuing rumors of coup plotting in Saigon point up discontent in high government and military circles. Although there is no evidence of advanced planning, some elements may be considering the ouster of President Diem as one step toward a solution of the Viet Cong problem.

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LAOS Page 16

Souvanna Phouma's efforts to expedite formation of a coalition government following his meeting with King Savang last week have encountered new obstacles. Boun Oum has rejected Souvanna's proposal for another meeting of the three princes in Xieng Khouang to discuss the composition of the cabinet, and Phoumi is again voicing doubts as to whether Souvanna would be able to form a "truly neutral" government. At Geneva, Western and Communist representatives are still at odds over several key aspects of a treaty on Laos.

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CAMBODIA Page 18

Sihanouk's diplomatic break with Thailand gives the Communist bloc another chance to increase its influence in Cambodia. Sihanouk has previously responded to slights from Thailand and South Vietnam by increasing his contacts with the bloc. While he has frequently asserted that he is anti-Communist and that his country is neutral, he believes South Vietnam and Thailand are a more immediate threat than Communism. Saigon and Bangkok view Cambodia as a weak link in Southeast Asian security.

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CONGO Page 19

Tshombé on 24 October accepted the UN's conditions for ratification of the 13 October cease-fire agreement between UN and Katanga forces. Implementation has proceeded without incident, but strains between these forces and between Leopoldville and Elisabethville are likely to remain. Adoula continues bent on bringing Katanga to heel and, recognizing his own limited military capability, is pressing for a new mandate for UN forces which would more clearly support this objective. Gizenga, in Stanleyville since 6 October, shows little inclination to return to Leopoldville, and may be trying to rebuild a center of opposition in his provincial stronghold.

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FRANCE-ALGERIA Page 21

Algerian rebel premier Ben Khedda's statement on 24 October offering to renew negotiations with France presented a new approach to a settlement--immediate agreement on independence without the formality of a referendum.

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Apparently anticipating French insistence on a referendum, however, Ben Khedda expressed willingness to continue working for a peaceful solution through this means. Should De Gaulle announce prior to 1 November an intention to resume negotiations, it would have the effect of encouraging the Secret Army Organization to precipitate violent demonstrations by Europeans to counter the Moslem demonstrations scheduled for that date.

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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Page 22

Nasir is taking steps to eliminate the potential for a rightist coup in Egypt and to dramatize his determination to press ahead with his socialist revolution. In Lebanon the resignation of strongly pro-Nasir Prime Minister Saib Salam may bring government changes which will inhibit the freedom of Egyptian agents to run subversive operations into Syria from Lebanese territory. The Jordanian Government staged its burlesque of free parliamentary elections last week without serious incident, but resentment continues widespread, especially among the Palestinians on Jordan's West Bank.

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STATUS OF SYRIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC Page 24

Although the USSR has not yet offered economic or military aid to the new Syrian Government, Moscow probably would extend such assistance if requested. The USSR apparently will continue work on projects under the \$150,-000,000 economic credit granted prior to Syria's union with Egypt in early 1958. Damascus has no known outstanding Soviet military aid credits.

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BLOC AIRCRAFT SALES IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Page 25

The bloc program to aid underdeveloped countries in establishing and expanding civil air facilities has been gaining momentum in recent months. Several types of civil aircraft have been sold to Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Cuba, and India, and in some of these countries the majority of transports operating on the national airlines were purchased from the bloc. The underdeveloped countries have been receptive to bloc offers because of favorable prices and terms.

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UN DEBATE ON SOUTH AFRICA Page 27

The General Assembly's Special Political Committee began debate on 23 October on the Republic of South Africa's apartheid policy amid strong indications that Ghana and other African states will succeed in having the assembly call for diplomatic and economic sanctions against the Verwoerd government. The General Assembly has never voted to apply sanctions against one of its member states.

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC Page 28

The recent antigovernment rioting may have heightened sentiment in the armed forces for suppressing both leftist and moderate opposition groups and even for the restoration of a military regime. The government made long-planned moves against pro-Castro leaders on 22 October but with only partial success; most of the leaders slated for deportation had gone into hiding. The government has been successful in forcing Generals Arismendi and Hector Trujillo to leave the country, but no change in the position of General Ramfis Trujillo appears likely in the immediate future. President Balaguer appealed on 23 October for an end to political rancor "in this moment of conciliation and concord." [redacted]

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BOLIVIA Page 29

Rioting has broken out in Bolivia following the imposition of higher prices for gasoline and fuel oil, an often-postponed measure which the International Monetary Fund has insisted is essential for the stabilization program. The government, which had evidently been hoping that its recent "discovery" of a revolutionary plot would distract public attention from the decree, declared a state of siege in the capital on 21 October and imposed domestic press censorship. The rioting does not appear to pose an immediate threat to President Paz' administration, but further violence is likely. [redacted]

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SPECIAL ARTICLES

BACKGROUND OF THE BLOC'S DISPUTE WITH ALBANIA Page 1

During the past year, the USSR and the satellites have attempted, through political, economic, and psychological pressures, to get Albania to conform to Khrushchev's international and party policies. In an effort to compensate for their growing isolation from the Soviet bloc, Albanian leaders have developed closer relations with Communist China and have extended economic feelers to the West. [redacted]

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THE CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION Page 5

Domestic dissatisfaction with the Castro regime is increasing, but is not believed to have reached a level where it is a serious threat to the government. The anti-Castro forces now include more people than before from the lower classes, although the majority in this group still supports Castro. The Castro regime has a hard core of fanatical backers and a large and efficient apparatus of repression. [redacted]

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Nehru, when he returns to the United States on 5 November, will be eager to explore international issues with President Kennedy, but the line Nehru takes is likely to be based firmly on the neutralist policy he has always felt best served India's national interest. The Indian leader's emphasis on negotiation and compromise as essential to ease cold war tensions stems largely from his fear that war would jeopardize India's economic development. India today is marked by relative political stability and steady economic progress, but regional and religious antagonisms persist, the ruling Congress party is weakened by factionalism and inertia, and the economy will be hampered for some time by unemployment, inflation, and a scarcity of industrial power.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****WEEKLY REVIEW****SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS**

What was billed in advance as the congress to outline the bright future of the USSR and the "socialist commonwealth" has been transformed into a sordid recounting of the struggle between Khrushchev and his opponents in the party and a public unveiling of the smoldering dispute between Khrushchev and his bloc opponents. Khrushchev's decision to turn instead to the long-dead "anti-party group" issue and the critical question of Soviet authority in the bloc is related to Khrushchev's success and failure in his dual role as Soviet leader and head of the international Communist movement.

In the former role, Khrushchev is celebrating his assumption of complete power in the USSR, where his position now appears unassailable. His close political lackeys have appeared at the 22nd congress in important roles for no other reason than their personal association with Khrushchev--much in the manner of Stalin's appointment of his own palace guard to the central committee. Khrushchev's review of the details of the conflict with the anti-party group, together with the strictures against the group by other Soviet leaders, are intended as a testimony to the magnitude of his victory. Equally important, Khrushchev is also proclaiming the validity of the policies which the group opposed. As leader of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev has succeeded in molding the party, its policies, and its intended course in his own image.

If Khrushchev's victory over the party is complete inside the USSR, however, his position as leader of the international movement has been marred by failure. The Chinese challenge to his authority, Albania's support for that challenge, and its own subsequent and successful defiance of the USSR had considerably weakened Moscow's authority in the Communist world. In November and December 1960 Khrushchev had been forced to compromise in the interest of unity, but the fragile accord that was reached was clearly regarded by both the Chinese and the Russians as a temporary truce rather than a definitive settlement. Khrushchev apparently has decided that the time has come to attempt to redress the balance.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The Soviet leaders' violent attacks on the Hoxha regime in Albania, which have completely overshadowed even the new Soviet party program at the congress, suggest that Khrushchev has deliberately chosen this issue to impose on Peiping a new test of strength in the continuing struggle for leadership in the international Communist movement. With characteristic boldness, he has moved to turn to his advantage the embarrassing situation posed by Albania's successful defiance of Soviet pressures to strike a blow at the Chinese leaders. He is attempting to place Peiping on the defensive at the outset by branding the Albanian leaders as deviationists, hoping to confront the Chinese with the alternatives of acquiescing in the Soviet indictment or

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reaffirming their support of a regime declared to be heretical and threatened with expulsion from the "socialist camp."

Khrushchev probably anticipated that the Chinese would, in fact, have no choice but to respond to his challenge because Chinese silence in the face of the Soviet assault would represent a major victory for the Soviet party and confirm its unquestioned supremacy in the "socialist world." He hopes to exploit Peiping's support of the Hoxha regime, which he has accused of "departing from the generally agreed line of the whole world Communist movement" and reverting to Stalinist practices, to discredit Peiping's claims to a co-equal voice in determining world Communist strategy and orthodoxy, and to demonstrate China's complete isolation in the "socialist commonwealth." Khrushchev also hopes the outcome of this new phase of the Sino-Soviet contest will make it more difficult in the future for Peiping to challenge Soviet leadership and to develop a rival center of authority.

Although Khrushchev in any event would have felt obliged at the party congress to take up the question of Albanian defiance, the concentrated violence of the assault on the Hoxha regime far transcends the immediate issue of Soviet-Albanian relations. It clearly points to a decision to force a showdown with the Chinese on carefully chosen terrain on which Khrushchev believes he will command a heavy advantage. The replacement of Soviet political, military, and economic influence in Albania by the Chinese posed a challenge to Moscow's authority and control in the Soviet bloc and the international Communist movement which could not be ignored indefinitely. The

failure of the Soviet attempt to overthrow the Hoxha regime in the summer of 1960 was a serious setback for the USSR which had far-reaching implications for its hegemony in Eastern Europe. China's subsequent actions in extending strong political support and increasing economic assistance to the Albanians made an eventual Soviet counter-offensive inevitable. Khrushchev now has decided that the opportune moment has arrived to reassert the unquestioned supremacy of the Soviet party over the bloc and the world Communist movement.

He may believe China's grave economic difficulties and agricultural disasters have reduced Peiping's ability to resist Soviet political pressure. The Chinese industrialization program was seriously disrupted by the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians, and the USSR has declined to extend any significant assistance over the past year. Chou En-lai, however, intimated in his speech to the Soviet congress that the firmness of China's ideological position would not be affected by its need for Soviet economic assistance. He asserted as Chinese leaders have since the Soviet withdrawal of technicians in 1960, that China could surmount its current difficulties by relying on the "work of our own hands."

Despite Chou En-lai's calculated displays of displeasure, Khrushchev has gone out of his way to make a cynical display of politeness to the Chinese delegation in Moscow. His motivation is probably two-fold: by ostentatiously shaking Chou's hand after his speech and seeing him off at the airport, Khrushchev hopes to make it appear that his attacks are really against Albania and not China, and these gestures provide him with a basis for later claiming,

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WEEKLY REVIEW OF COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

if it becomes necessary, that he "did everything possible" to maintain Sino-Soviet unity. At the same time, Moscow has made it clear that Chinese behavior has not been that of a "comradely" country. A telecast of the congress proceedings on 19 October showed Chou shaking hands with Kozlov and Kosygin, ignoring Khrushchev who stood between them.

Chou En-lai's reproach of Khrushchev at the party congress for airing the Albanian issue and his early departure from Moscow reflect the Chinese leaders' recognition of the gravity of the Soviet challenge. Chou was met at Peiping airport by Mao Tse-tung and seven other politburo members--apparently a deliberate move to show approval of Chou's stand at the congress and to demonstrate Chinese solidarity. The members of the Chinese delegation who remained at the Congress are currently touring Leningrad, probably awaiting the outcome of politburo deliberations in Peiping to hammer out the details of the Chinese response.

The decision now being worked out in Peiping may follow the lines set forth in a Chinese Foreign Ministry document sent last January to embassies for their guidance. It noted that since bloc unity was to be the regime's basic objective in 1961, the Chinese would not take the initiative to reopen the debate but would not back down if again confronted with "erroneous thinking inside the international Communist movement." It specifically affirmed that Peiping would give "all-out" political and economic support to Albania.

Chou En-lai's remark in his brief speech to the party congress that "open and one-

sided" criticism of a fraternal party could not be regarded as a serious Marxist-Leninist approach was a clear rebuke of Khrushchev. His further insistence that the principle of consultation and full equality among bloc members should be observed suggests the course that Peiping will probably adopt in its defense of Tirana. This course will incorporate the high moral stand urged by Chou in March 1957 to "reserve differences while upholding solidarity." If Khrushchev continues to force the Albanian issue, however, the Chinese appear ready to respond with the belligerence that characterized their arguments at the height of the Sino-Soviet dispute in 1959 and 1960.

There are indications, in fact, of a developing view in Peiping that Khrushchev has already pressed matters to the point where a strong response is necessary and that any further effort to cover up the dispute would be futile. Up to 26 October, the Chinese, while making their sympathies for Albania clear, had given little press or radio coverage to the Moscow conference, where attacks on Albania were the order of the day. On 26 October, however, People's Daily publicized the full details of the charges against Albania made by Khrushchev and delegates from other Communist parties, along with the angry reply of the Albanian central committee.

Other Communist Reaction

The next phase of the contest may be a post-congress meeting of bloc parties or all Communist parties, and Chou En-lai may return to Moscow after his consultations with Mao, as Pravda staff members have claimed. Reactions from other Communist leaders provide an

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indication of the probable groupings that would develop at an international Communist meeting.

The European satellites, Mongolia, and most Western Communist parties have associated themselves clearly and forcefully with the Soviet attack on Albania. The European satellites in their domestic propaganda have made it clear that the preferred course would be for Albania to demonstrate the proper contrition and thus maintain bloc unity, but they have also indicated the improbability of such a course and have begun to prepare public and party opinion for whatever actions may be taken against Tirana. Ulbricht's accusation in his speech on 20 October that Albania had "grossly violated...joint decisions of the Warsaw Pact" suggests that Albania may even be formally expelled from that body.

Many of the Asian parties, however, have failed to give the Soviet Union this kind of support and have indicated varying degrees of reserve. On the basis of TASS summaries --which may not reflect all the nuances of the delegates' remarks --it appears that North Korea and North Vietnam among the bloc parties declined to echo the Soviet charges against Albania. The Indian, Indonesian, and Japanese parties have also been silent on the Albanian issue. The North Koreans, however, and perhaps some of the others as well, carefully hedged their silence on Albania with intimations of their interest in seeing a spirit of compromise and concession in Tirana.

"Antiparty Group" Charges

A major purpose of Khrushchev's revival of charges

against the Soviet antiparty group is to establish a clear link between this issue and the "cult of personality" indictment against the Albanian--and, by implication, the Chinese--leaders. The speeches by Khrushchev and his top colleagues have centered on accusations that the antiparty group "fiercely opposed" de-Stalinization and desired a return to the repressive measures of the Stalin era. Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov have been charged with personal responsibility for many of Stalin's crimes.

In addition, the antiparty group is indicted with failing to assess correctly the international scene, and the examples of their failure bear a striking resemblance to the positions held by the Chinese and Albanian leaders. Molotov, for example, was condemned by Mikoyan for opposing the policy of peaceful coexistence and for conceding the inevitability of war. Mikoyan's assertion that Molotov regarded peaceful coexistence as the temporary absence of war and opposed personal meetings of top leaders of East and West is close to a description of charges against Mao's advocacy of a militant interpretation of peaceful coexistence. Thus the present leadership's condemnations of the policies which Khrushchev defeated in the USSR when he foiled the plots of the anti-party group are but thinly veiled attacks on the vestiges of those same policies which continue to exist in Communist China and Albania.

Pains are being taken, however, to deny that resurrection of the antiparty group issue reflects a fresh challenge to Khrushchev's leadership. First Deputy Premier Kosygin said, "We are doing this now to show again to the party and the people where the personality cult can lead.... We want the lessons of history never to be forgotten." Leonid

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Ilichev, the party's agitation and propaganda boss, made it clear that criticism of the "cult of personality" should not be confused with the authority of present leaders. He flatly warned that the party would do its utmost to protect the authority of those who were "devoting all their energies" to the cause of Communism.

This treatment is clearly designed to strengthen Khrushchev's position as the supreme authority of Communist orthodoxy in the coming contest with Peiping by attempting to disarm in advance any Chinese counter-claims that Khrushchev himself is vulnerable to the same charges he has directed against the antiparty group. At the same time, the attacks on the old Stalinists have the effect of demonstrating to the Soviet people how much better off they have been under Khrushchev and, indirectly, to pay tribute to the man who prevented a return to Stalinist terror by smashing the group.

Both this and the open adulation of Khrushchev are aimed at bolstering still further the image of the Soviet party chief as the legitimate successor to Lenin. Virtually all congress speakers have contributed to the burgeoning "cult of Khrushchev." To date, the high point in the adulation of Khrushchev is Defense Minister Malinovsky's

reference to Khrushchev as "our supreme commander-in-chief"--an appellation no Soviet leader has enjoyed since Stalin assumed the title "Generalissimo" in the early days of World War II.

Foreign Policy Implications

While it is too early to assess the effects of this new demonstration of bloc disunity on Soviet tactics on Berlin and Germany, there is no indication that it will cause Khrushchev to reduce his demands on the Western powers or retreat from his intention to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. The relaxation of his year-end deadline on a treaty will give Khrushchev greater freedom of maneuver in dealing with the West, but it is unlikely that this move was dictated by his decision to join issue with the Chinese on Albania and the "cult of personality."

Khrushchev has firmly restated his commitment to the peaceful coexistence strategy, which includes negotiations and contacts with Western leaders. Any retreat from this general line would be interpreted throughout the Communist world as a concession to the Chinese. The high stakes involved in this intra-bloc struggle, however, may well compel Khrushchev to subordinate policy considerations vis-a-vis the West to the overriding demands of prosecuting

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his new drive against the Chinese Communists.

Economic Developments

Economic discussion at the congress has continued to center on problems of efficient planning and management of the large and complex construction program. Kosygin's speech proposed some new measures to increase the efficiency of the construction program. The program has long been hampered by the fact that the construction material and production equipment industries have not kept pace with the volume of building; moreover, the system has failed to provide incentives for timely completion of projects. Investment has been spread thinly among too many projects instead of being concentrated on the important ones; as a result, construction is prolonged.

Kosygin repeated some of the standard admonitions of the past: planning of new construction will be closely

linked with the provision of supplies of materials and equipment; funds must be earmarked primarily for projects about to be completed; new projects will be allowed only when similar projects, already under way, have sufficient resources for their completion; incentive awards will be tied to the completion of projects.

Kosygin also indicated some new measures may be tried. To ensure timely receipt of equipment at construction sites, payment may be withheld until the equipment is actually placed in operation. He also suggests as an "experiment" a transition from budgetary financing of capital investment to long-term credits. Funds could therefore be firmly earmarked for specific construction projects rather than parceled out in annual plans. Kosygin's remarks imply that the construction authority will be charged interest for the credits in order to stimulate rapid completion of projects. [redacted]

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Since 15 October, the Ulbricht regime has made a systematic effort to force US officials to acknowledge the right of East German guards at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint in East Berlin to exercise control over US-licensed vehicles driven by civilians. At the outset, Soviet authorities appear to have made an attempt to dissociate themselves from the East German actions; on 25 October, however, the USSR indicated that it was firmly backing the East German claims.

US officials maintain that US official license plates are in themselves sufficient identification as far as the East Germans are concerned. In accordance with long-established practice and US rights under the occupation agreements, the US takes the position that only Soviet officials may control movements of US personnel, whether uniformed or not. In contrast to the Americans and the French, the British have been in the habit for several years of flashing identification documents when requested, but they have never actually handed them over to the East German guards.

Sector Border Incidents

The first serious incidents occurred on 15 October, when East German guards on four occasions refused to pass US-licensed vehicles operated by civilians. In one case, they subsequently permitted one vehicle to pass the checkpoint after a uniformed driver took the wheel.

On 17 October, US political Adviser Howard Trivers called upon the Soviet political ad-

viser, Lt. Col. Lazarev, to protest the incidents and outline the US case. Lazarev, unusually courteous, said Soviet authorities lacked adequate descriptions of US official license plates. He thought everything would be all right if US authorities would supply complete sets of descriptions and photographs of plates currently in use by US personnel. He said he would undertake to see that facsimiles were provided to East German authorities at the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint as well as to Soviet officials at the Marienborn checkpoint on the Autobahn.

In the light of Lazarev's implicit recognition of Western rights of free circulation in Berlin, Trivers after the meeting immediately forwarded the necessary information on US license plates.

Despite Lazarev's assurances to Trivers, further incidents occurred in which East German sector border guards refused to permit US civilians to pass through the Friedrichstrasse checkpoint without showing identification.


On 22 October, the East Germans demanded identification from E. Allen Lightner, assistant chief of the US Mission in Berlin. After long delays and failure by the East German guards to summon a Soviet officer, as requested by Lightner, the American commandant in Berlin dispatched an armed escort of US military police to escort Lightner into East Berlin. Lightner and his escort twice went into the Soviet sector and withdrew.

Soon afterward, Lazarev arrived at the Friedrichstrasse

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AUTHORIZED BORDER CROSSING POINTSMEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS
AND OCCUPATION FORCES ONLY

8. Friedrichstrasse
- WEST GERMANS ONLY
3. Bornholmerstrasse
9. Heinrich Heine Strasse
- WEST BERLINERS ONLY
5. Chausseestrasse
6. Invalidenstrasse
10. Oberbaumbruecke
13. Sonnen Allee

ORIGINAL CROSSING POINTS
OF 13 AUGUST NOW CLOSED

- I. Kopenhagenerstrasse
2. Wollankstrasse
4. Brunnenstrasse
7. Brandenburger Tor (Gate)
- II. Puschkin Allee
12. Eisenstrasse
14. Rudowerstrasse

Authorized East Germans and East Berliners presumably can cross at any Border Points still open.

checkpoint and conferred with the US provost marshal. Lazarev admitted that the East Germans had made a mistake and that it would be corrected. Lightner then drove his car across the sector border and returned, without escort or hindrance.

The following day the East German news agency carried an announcement of the Interior Ministry attacking US authorities for the incident of the preceding day. It stated that the regime's police are under instructions to permit foreigners

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to pass only after showing their passports and claimed that "persons in civilian clothes" were trying to evade these regulations without "proving" membership in the Western occupation forces.

On 24 October, East German guards on two occasions turned back US-licensed vehicles driven by officials in civilian clothes. On the second occasion, the US provost marshal drove to the scene but was unable to induce East German police to let the automobile pass. The following day the East Germans again halted a US vehicle. When the US provost marshal demanded a Soviet officer be summoned immediately, the East German guard declared that the regime does not recognize US license plates.

Trivers then telephoned Soviet headquarters to demand a Soviet officer. A new Soviet political adviser, Col. Alekseyev, arrived, accompanied by Lazarev. Alekseyev took a belligerent tone with US officials from the outset. He told the US provost marshal that the East German government had made a decision not to recognize license plates of US forces and repeated this assertion to Trivers. Lazarev, moreover, denied he had given Trivers assurance on 17 October of no further difficulties. When the US provost marshal warned that an armed escort would be sent to shepherd the

American vehicle into Berlin, Alekseyev declared: "No, you won't!" Nevertheless, US military police escorted the car into East Berlin and back without interference.

Major General Watson, American commander in Berlin, saw Soviet commandant Solovyev that afternoon to protest the series of incidents. Solovyev strongly backed East Germany's claim to the right to exercise controls at the sector border and maintained that Soviet authorities cannot influence or interfere with East German actions there. He rejected General Watson's contention that the license plate was adequate identification and demanded that civilians henceforth show their identification documents.

While Watson was conferring with Solovyev, the East Germans halted two US Army sightseeing buses and demanded that the civilian occupants identify themselves. Although the East Germans heretofore have asked for identification from such clearly marked vehicles, they have not actually denied entry.

On 26 October, the East Germans again attempted to deny entry into East Berlin to a US-licensed vehicle, and again military police escorted the car from the Soviet sector.

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Bloc Comment on Berlin

In contrast to the belligerent behavior of the Communists at the Berlin sector border, Soviet and bloc leaders have continued to follow Khrushchev's lead in avoiding extensive polemical treatment of Berlin and Germany pending further exploratory talks with the US in Moscow. In his speech to the party congress on 25 October, Foreign Minister Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union would spare no efforts to "find a common language with the Western powers on the question of a German peace treaty." At the same time he warned that the bloc would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany if it proved impossible to reach agreement with the Western powers. His statements on Soviet policy also reflected the more moderate line toward the West which marked Khrushchev's initial address on 17 October.

Gromyko emphasized that Soviet foreign policy had been successful because of its "flexibility and desire to take into consideration the interests of partners in talks." He also claimed that the meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna was "one of the most outstanding events of our time," and went to some lengths to point up "the great importance" the Soviet Government attached to the state of its relations with the US.

Both First Deputy Premier Mikoyan and East German party leader Ulbricht stressed the

urgency of a peace settlement with Germany but without mentioning a deadline. Like Khrushchev, Mikoyan and Ulbricht claimed that there had been some shifts in the position of the West, and Mikoyan attributed this to Khrushchev's efforts. Ulbricht stated that "it is a very good thing" that talks had begun between the US and USSR. He warned, however, that Paris and Bonn aimed at postponing negotiations in order to gain time for equipping West Germany with atomic weapons.

In line with the general emphasis of Berlin at the Soviet party congress, the Polish and Czech party leaders, Gomulka and Novotny, in their speeches mentioned these issues in a brief pro forma manner.

A Soviet official in Paris who returned from Moscow on 20 October told an American representative that the question of access to Berlin could easily be solved by a four-power agreement guaranteeing free access. He stressed that this was of minor importance to the "main interest" of the USSR in obtaining a peace treaty with both Germanys, which would confirm the Oder-Neisse line and recognize the existing border between East and West Germany. While he noted the importance of an early four-power foreign ministers' conference, the Soviet spokesman also stated that the conference could not be called to deal only with Berlin but should have as its main purpose the preparation of a German peace conference.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SOUTH VIETNAM**


Public uneasiness in Saigon over the Viet Cong problem has been increased by the succession of guerrilla successes over the past two months, the government's sudden declaration of a national emergency, cancellation of the 26 October National Day celebrations, and the publicity given the Communist

torture-murder of South Vietnam's liaison officer to the International Control Commission.

Communist Guerrilla Activity in South Vietnam**SECRET**

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Several top officials are becoming more openly critical of Diem's methods of rule and apparently feel that reforms must be forced on him. Vice President Tho commented to the Taylor mission that popular morale could easily be revived if the government worked properly.

Viet Cong activity during the week ending 20 October surpassed the previous week's high, with most incidents occur-

ring in the southern provinces. Reports--still unconfirmed--that guerrilla forces are concentrated around the Saigon area may be related to the rumors of coup plots as well as of intended raids by terrorists in connection with the National Day period.

Rail sabotage near Phan Thiet on 22 October and a reported attack at An Khé, on the highway linking Pleiku in the central highlands with the coast at Qui Ngon, point to a continued drive by the Viet Cong against north-south land communications. The Viet Cong's failure to hold key points gained in large-scale actions suggests that these are still largely diversionary raids and that the Communists continue to concentrate on erosion of government control at the village level.

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LAOS

Boun Oum's rejection of Souvanna's proposal for a meeting of the three princes in Xieng Khouang has dimmed prospects for the early establishment of a coalition government in Laos. General Phoumi explained this action on the grounds that the royal government had made "all concessions possible" toward the achievement of a satisfactory coalition, and that it was "now up to Souvanna to form a government." Once again, Phoumi, convinced that Souvanna is dominated by the Pathet Lao, is doubting the wisdom of forming a Souvanna-controlled coalition

government and would prefer to postpone--or, if possible, prevent--the creation of such a coalition.

Vientiane forces have continued limited sweep operations in northern Laos, and in the Thakhek region of central Laos are preparing to mount a counterattack in an effort to regain territory recently lost to the rebels. Meo units have continued their harassment of enemy forces throughout Xieng Khouang Province.

During his talks with Ambassador Harriman on 20 October

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



on the crucial issue of voting procedure for the International Control Commission (ICC), Soviet delegate Pushkin did not come up with any new draft but repeated his earlier assurance that the ICC, by a majority vote, could initiate investigations. On a related point he submitted an ambiguous draft dealing with the manner in which the ICC is to report its findings.

Pushkin claimed the draft's ambiguity--attempting to preserve the principle of unanimity

while allowing some provision for a minority viewpoint--was calculated to "make it easier on all sides" to reach agreement. He implied that he was having difficulties with the Chinese on the whole question of the ICC's operations in Laos. Pushkin, however, tried to assure Harriman that he would never go back on any previously agreed understanding between them and maintained that the draft "would not produce any problems in later practice."

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****CAMBODIA**

Cambodia's decision on 23 October to sever diplomatic relations with Thailand resulted directly from a thinly veiled public attack on Prince Sihanouk by Prime Minister Sarit of Thailand on 20 October. The Thai Government has closed the Thai-Cambodian border militarily and reinforced its border guard. Cambodia, on its part, has canceled all military leaves and recalled all military personnel to their units. The break in relations gives the Communist bloc another chance to improve its standing in Cambodia.

Prince Sihanouk, who considers himself anti-Communist, is more fearful of Thai and South Vietnamese aggression than he is of Communist incursions from Laos and North Vietnam or subversion by Communist China. In his efforts to preserve his country's neutrality, he usually balances his periodic outbursts against Western institutions, such as SEATO, with criticisms of the Communist bloc. However, whenever his relations with his two neighbors become strained, Sihanouk, who considers the West closely identified with the interests of Saigon and Bangkok, tends to align his country more closely with the bloc.

Since the Geneva Agreements of 1954, both Thailand and South Vietnam have made no secret of their view that Cambodia is a weak link in Southeast Asian security. In 1956, Sihanouk, accusing his neighbors

of trying to strangle Cambodia economically, accepted a \$22,-400,000 grant from Peiping. In October, he expelled the Chinese Nationalist consular representative from Phnom Penh.

By November 1958, tensions over a disputed border temple and Thai criticism of Cambodia's relations with the bloc caused Sihanouk to "temporarily suspend" diplomatic relations with Thailand for three months.

During the period leading to an abortive coup attempt in early 1959, the bloc's standing in Cambodia was boosted by efforts of the Chinese Communist Embassy in Phnom Penh to keep Sihanouk informed of South Vietnamese involvement. Saigon's revival of South Vietnamese claims to small islands off the Cambodian coast in 1960 resulted in a carte blanche offer of aid from Peiping in the event of hostilities. Sihanouk has used this offer as a diplomatic weapon, but so far has refused to accept bloc military assistance.

Penn Nouth, Cambodia's first minister, has informed both the Chinese Communist ambassador in Phnom Penh and Ambassador Trimble that while Cambodia seeks no war with Thailand, if the country is invaded the government will ask for help everywhere, even from the "Reds." If Cambodians are forced to choose, he asserted, they would rather become "slaves" to Communist China than to their enemies, the Thais.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****CONGO**

Tshombé on 24 October accepted the UN's conditions for ratification of the cease-fire concluded on 13 October between UN and Katangan forces. The exchange of prisoners has taken place without incident, and UN and Katangan forces are in process of re-positioning their forces as agreed.

Pressed by Premier Adoula and the Congo Advisory Committee, UN officials in New York insisted that Tshombé acknowledge: (1) that the cease-fire agreement did contravene existing UN resolutions on the Congo; (2) that it was a military agreement without political implications; (3) that it applied only to Katanga; and (4) that it in no way affected the Congo's territorial limits as previously understood by the UN. These conditions induced Leopoldville to withdraw its initial rejection of the agreement. However, differences over Article 10, which gave Tshombé the right to defend himself from "external" attack and appeared to neutralize the UN forces in that event, seem to have been glossed over.

Strains between Leopoldville and Elisabethville are unlikely to be substantially

lessened. Adoula continues bent on bringing Katanga to heel and appears to be working to obtain a new UN mandate which would specifically permit military action by UN forces to end Katanga's secession. On 17 October, Foreign Minister Bomboyo argued to UN officials that the cease-fire strengthened Tshombé and that Leopoldville would have to take military action, since the Adoula government could survive only if Katanga were brought back into the Congo.

Leopoldville has only limited military capabilities, however, and would have enormous equipment and transport problems in any Katanga invasion. Successful action by Leopoldville would require close support from UN forces. Pressures for a new, more "energetic" mandate for UN forces in the Congo are reportedly growing in the UN General Assembly.

Tshombé, under pressure from the UN, sent two low-level emissaries to Leopoldville on 18 October to propose an economic and customs union and a union of military forces with no infringement on Katanga's existence as a separate political entity.

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Press reports indicate that Adoula gave them a flat rejection, although privately he may have left the door open to further negotiations.

Reports from Elisabethville reflect a high degree of confidence on Tshombé's part. He reportedly takes the attitude that if Leopoldville or the UN insisted on a highly centralized government, Katanga would say, "Come and get us." On 18 October, Tshombé's troops were reported restive, hostile to discipline, and eager to renew the fight with UN forces.

While Tshombé has not carried out his threat to take military action against the rebellious anti-Tshombé Baluba refugees, 30,000 of whom are camped on the outskirts of Elisabethville, he has reserved the right to maintain order "by all means possible." A tight Katanga-enforced cordon rings the camp, and no one is permitted to leave except those who agree to return home. Clashes between the Balubas and Katangan forces are frequent.

The Belgian Government appears reluctant to apply economic and financial sanctions against Tshombé, for example by holding up tax payments by Union Miniere to the Katangan government. Foreign Minister Spaak told Ambassador MacArthur that the legal authority of the Bel-

gian Government to take such steps would have to be studied. Spaak said he feared that such action would cause Tshombé to nationalize all Belgian industries in Katanga. Spaak claims that if the Belgian public should hold the government responsible for initiating an action that caused nationalization, the result could be "disastrous" for the government. Spaak argued that a rapprochement between Tshombé and Adoula could best be promoted by a moderate African nation or an individual with an understanding of Bantu psychology.

Gizenga returned to Stanleyville on 6 October, presumably for a temporary stay. Adoula and Gizengists in Leopoldville have continued to express concern over Gizenga's delay in returning. Leopoldville's suspicions that Gizenga may be planning new moves against it will be increased by the reports on 25 October that his long-time foe, Orientale Province head Jean Manzikala, had been ousted and replaced by Gizengist Simon Losala.

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Gizengists in Leopoldville, headed by Interior Minister Gbenye, feared army leader General Mobutu would arrest and execute them and were considering withdrawing to Stanleyville. Gizenga's success in posing Stanleyville again as a competing center of power to Leopoldville would depend in large measure on the aid he could obtain from his outside supporters, the Soviet bloc and radical African and Arab states.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****FRANCE-ALGERIA**

Algerian rebel premier Ben Khedda's statement on 24 October offering to renew negotiations with France presented a new approach to a settlement--immediate agreement on independence without the formality of a referendum. Apparently anticipating French insistence on a referendum, however, Ben Khedda expressed willingness to continue working for a peaceful solution through this means. His preference that negotiations be limited to Algerian independence and a cease-fire was linked with a proposed procedure that might allow for the negotiation of guarantees for the European minority and other vital French interests before an actual declaration of independence.

The program outlined by Ben Khedda, although a reiteration of the establishment rebel position, could open the way for negotiations for independence and a cease-fire and, simultaneously, preparations for a referendum on the results of these negotiations. Minister for Algerian Affairs Joxe indicated to a French parliamentary committee on 25 October that the French would stand by President De Gaulle's three-year-old policy on a referendum so that all the Algerian people--not just the rebel provisional government (PAG)--could express their desires.

In agreeing to cooperate in a self-determination referendum, Ben Khedda stressed that such a process was unnecessarily time-consuming, since the Algerians would certainly opt for independence. By presenting his preferred solution as designed to achieve an almost immediate solution, Ben Khedda was evidently attempting to place on De Gaulle the onus for continued hostilities. In arguing that events have rendered a referendum unnecessary, Ben Khedda was

also alluding to the responsiveness of Algerians to the orders of the rebel government--as evidenced by last week's Moslem demonstrations in Paris, for which the PAG has claimed credit.

Although Paris has rejected the details of the rebel proposal, the French appear to be encouraged by the tone, which may indicate that substantial agreement has been achieved in secret exchanges reported to have taken place in recent weeks. If full-scale negotiations are resumed they probably will be conducted secretly, since both sides reportedly feel that another publicized failure would be disastrous.

De Gaulle presumably still intends to visit Algeria to make some move toward establishing a consultative body which would be the forerunner of the provisional executive body to organize the referendum. According to the US consul general at Algiers, Joxe has consulted with presidents and vice presidents of departmental and regional councils, apparently in an effort to convene an Algerian assembly. The latter would designate a predominantly Moslem consultative committee, which itself would later comprise the executive.

Joxe's cabinet director expressed concern to US officials last week that the Algerian riots in Paris would make negotiations extremely difficult. He felt that the riots had created anti-Arab feeling in metropolitan France which was producing a conviction that "the only thing they understand is force" and that negotiations with such people could not be fruitful. He said this attitude would become firmer if new riots were to take place in connection with the

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY**

1 November Algerian "National Day" observances the PAG apparently intends to conduct in France as well as Algeria.

The American Embassy's comment on the Paris demonstrations noted that throughout France they had aroused indignation that Paris should be turned into another Algerian battleground, shock over the degree of rebel remote control, and concern that the situation would degenerate to the point of gravely compromising any Algerian settlement. In addition to regular police, the government has massed in Paris 10 Republican Security companies and 25 squadrons of mobile gendarmerie. While apparently fully capable of controlling further demonstrations in metropolitan France, the government is being subjected to a wave of protest from conservative as well as liberal and leftist political elements concerning police brutality in quelling last week's manifestations.

The timing of reported plans of the anti - De Gaulle Secret Army Organization (OAS) to create

massive violence in Algeria in a desperate effort to prevent a "liberal" Algerian solution probably depends on its assessment of the imminence of decisive French moves in this direction. A belief that negotiations with the PAG are about to be resumed could lead the OAS to provoke major violence during the 1 November Moslem demonstrations the PAG appears determined to stage throughout Algeria. The US consul general in Algiers comments that even if the PAG order for peaceful demonstrations is initially observed by the Moslems, a few grenades thrown among the demonstrators by European activists could quickly produce the violence desired by OAS.

Ben Khedda's offer to resume negotiations is also clouded by continuing reports of a rift between the Algerian rebel army commanders and the Tunis-based PAG which has already resulted in open disregard of PAG orders. Ben Khedda is reportedly making strong efforts to effect a reconciliation, but the possibility remains that rebel fighters would not accept a settlement negotiated by the PAG.

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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS**Egypt**

Nasir, who had promised to benefit from his "mistake" of trusting "reactionary elements" in Syria, has started harsh action against the remnants of the wealthy class in Egypt. He is aiming to eliminate the base for any rightist coup and, at the same time, to dramatize his

determination to press ahead with his socialist revolution. The government has announced that it has arrested 40 wealthy civilians and has taken custody of the property of 167 other "reactionary capitalists." Further actions of the same sort are in process.

In the armed forces, where anti-regime leaflets have

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reportedly been circulated and there have been persistent rumors of coup or assassination plotting, Nasir apparently has ordered an extensive security screening. A number of officers considered "reactionaries" or dissidents of some other sort have been arrested in what may be the beginning of a major shake-up of the officer corps.

In reshuffling his cabinet last week, Nasir retained the same men in the key posts but tightened the organizational structure considerably. Vice President Baghdadi, who now also heads the ministries of Planning and Treasury, is the dominant figure in the economic field. He may get significant assistance from the new minister of agriculture, Nagib Hashad, a capable professional agriculturalist. Vice President Zakariyya Muhyi al-Din, also minister of interior, is again the key man in the police and security field, in which he has performed effectively in the past. Despite rumors that Field Marshal Amir would be ousted because of disagreements with Nasir stemming from Syrian secession, he continues as a vice president and as minister of defense.

This revised and streamlined cabinet has neither a strong radical nor conservative slant; it does have some good technicians and will probably be more effective than its rather unwieldy predecessor in carrying out the socialist policies already set in Egypt. Some additional cabinet shifts

are a possibility, and changes will be made in the bureaucracy and in the National Union, Nasir's single-party political system.

Nasir is continuing his efforts to get a major subversion program under way against Syria and Jordan. The resignation of strongly pro-Nasir Prime Minister Saib Salam in Lebanon and ensuing government changes may, however, inhibit the freedom of action of Egyptian agents there to conduct operations into Syria.

Jordan

Parliamentary elections took place last week without major incident, although pro-Nasir Jordanians staged a few small demonstrations against King Husayn's government. The results having been determined in advance by the government's screening of candidates, only 10 to 15 percent of the electorate went through the motions of voting. At least 57 of the 60 deputies elected are rightists and supporters of the government.

The resulting resentment is particularly strong in the West Bank area, where the Palestinian population is large. The regime may find it necessary to rely more and more strongly on the army to preserve its control. Husayn's concern over the loyalty of military units is suggested by a report that he gave personal orders last week for the dismissal of 65 officers and men. [redacted]

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****STATUS OF SYRIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE BLOC**

Although the USSR has made no offers of economic or military aid to the new Syrian Government, it probably would extend such assistance if requested. Meanwhile, the USSR apparently will continue work on the projects scheduled under the existing \$150,000,000 economic credit. The agreement providing for this credit was concluded in 1957 prior to Syria's union with Egypt in early 1958. It calls for several land-reclamation projects, plus the construction of some small plants and factories and the Latakia-Aleppo-Qamishliya railroad.

The major project was to have been a hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates River, but, largely because of Soviet hesitation following the formation of the UAR and the Iraqi revolution, the project was assigned to West Germany earlier this year. This has made available about \$70,000,000 of the Soviet credit for other projects.

Some of the European satellites have in recent years provided relatively small, medium-term credits to Syria for the construction of a variety of projects, but the Soviet credit is the only major one now available from the bloc. The larger aid credits the satellites extended to the UAR apparently were designated mainly for the Egyptian region. One of the new Damascus government's criticisms of Cairo is that, with the exception of the recent West German credit for the Euphrates dam, Syria never benefited from foreign aid provided to the UAR.

The satellites now probably would be willing to

increase their commercial credit extensions to Syria, and some may offer long-term aid. Total satellite aid to Syria amounts to less than \$30,000,000.

The new government also has expressed its dissatisfaction with military assistance from the bloc under the UAR, claiming that arms and equipment promised the Syrian region had been "stolen" by Egypt. This is an apparent reference to the Soviet-Syrian arms deal concluded in early 1958 just prior to the formation of the UAR. Some naval vessels, combat aircraft, and probably certain land armaments originally ordered by Damascus were delivered instead to Egypt at Cairo's request.

Other bloc-UAR arms agreements concluded since 1958 have been designed basically to develop the armed forces of Egypt. As a result, Syrian military circles probably feel there is a need to make up lost ground by acquiring new arms supplies--a "need" which Moscow probably would be willing to fill if asked. Between 1956 and 1958, the bloc--chiefly the USSR--provided Syria with about \$250,000,000 in military assistance, most of it prior to the creation of the UAR.

The Soviet Union and the other members of the bloc probably will also seek to revive trade with Syria. In 1960, bloc-Syrian trade amounted to less than \$40,000,000, with the bloc taking about 23 percent of Syria's exports and providing about 9 percent of its imports. The USSR, Syria's chief trading partner in the bloc, for the most part exchanged oil for cotton. [REDACTED] (Prepared by ORR)

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****BLOC AIRCRAFT SALES IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES**

The bloc program to aid underdeveloped countries in the establishment and expansion of civil air facilities has been gaining momentum in recent months. Large numbers of several types of civil aircraft--both piston and high-performance turboprop--have been sold to Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Cuba, and India; in the three West African countries the majority of the transports operating on the national lines were purchased from the bloc.


Such aid, relatively small in value, affords the bloc a disproportionately large opportunity to enhance its prestige and increase its penetration in some areas of the non-Communist world. Despite the fact that comparable Western planes are in many ways superior, the underdeveloped countries have been receptive to bloc offers; this is primarily because the bloc's prices and terms are more favorable.

Two types of Soviet high-performance commercial aircraft have been sold outside the bloc thus far--the IL-18, a large transport capable of carrying 75-100 passengers, and the AN-12 military transport. The IL-18 has been sold exclusively in Africa, where at least 12 now are in operation on commercial routes out of Conakry, Accra, and Bamako. Additional IL-18s--reportedly five--ordered by Guinea will soon be delivered. The total cost of these planes is estimated at approximately \$30,000,000, and presumably all were purchased on credit.

India has been the principal customer for the AN-12 and is using it to airlift equipment to the Himalayan frontier near the Sino-Indian border. Originally India purchased eight AN-12s plus auxiliary equipment and spare engines for \$21,000,000, to be repaid over a five-year period in Indian rupees. These eight have all been delivered. Despite serious

SOVIET CIVIL AIRCRAFT

AN-12



AN-2



IL-14



MI-4

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problems with the aircraft, India now has ordered six or eight more--presumably for the same operation. One AN-12 has been purchased by Ghana.

The USSR has sold more IL-14s--light piston transports with a capacity of about 24 passengers--than any other type of aircraft. India, Cuba, Mali, and Cambodia have purchased a total of 41 of these planes from Moscow. In India, 24 rebuilt IL-14s purchased at a cost of some \$4,500,000 have now been delivered and are engaged in limited operations along with the AN-12s in the northern border area. Cuba apparently has contracted for some 12 IL-14s, but only a few have been delivered. Cambodia and Mali have recently received several of these aircraft and will soon have them in operation.

The AN-2 biplane also is being seen in increasing numbers in the underdeveloped countries. This plane, which can be landed in a small space, has numerous uses, including crop dusting, cargo and mail transport, and aerial photography; it is particularly useful in countries where communication facilities are limited. The USSR has sold these planes to Guinea, Mali, and Cuba.

Helicopters are also becoming increasingly popular because of their adaptability. The Soviet MI-4 is being exported to Mali, Cuba, and India. India's initial doubts about the capabilities of these helicopters apparently were overrid-

den by the favorable terms offered.

The USSR has in the past attempted to interest underdeveloped countries in buying its large TU-104 jet transport, the efficiency of which is questionable. This aircraft was offered to India, Egypt, Iraq, and Ghana, but no sales were concluded.

Czechoslovakia also has supplied several types of civil aircraft to countries outside the bloc. An exporter of small light civil aircraft for many years, Czechoslovakia has recently been offering a greater variety of designs on favorable terms. The Czech variant of the Soviet IL-14 (neither version is any longer in production) has been sold to Guinea on credit terms and now is the major transport on internal Guinean air routes. More recently Czechoslovakia extended a credit to Mali which probably will be used to buy several different types of Czech aircraft.

One of the methods used to popularize bloc planes has been to give specially outfitted IL-14s and MI-4 helicopters to national leaders for their personal use. During the Bulganin-Khrushchev trip through Asia in 1955, IL-14s were presented to the leaders of Afghanistan, India, and Burma. Since then the leaders of Egypt, Yemen, Iran, Guinea, Ghana, Ethiopia, Cuba, Nepal, and Cambodia have received such gifts.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****UN DEBATE ON SOUTH AFRICA**

The General Assembly's Special Political Committee began debate on 23 October on the Republic of South Africa's apartheid policy amid strong indications that the African states will succeed this year in their efforts to have the assembly recommend sanctions against the Verwoerd government. Ghana--which spearheaded an unsuccessful attempt to do this last year--has been privately circulating a draft resolution recommending breaking off diplomatic relations, imposing an economic boycott, and closing ports to South African ships and aircraft. The draft resolution also calls for expelling South Africa from the United Nations, but the Ghanaian UN delegate acknowledges that this provision will probably be dropped in order to get moderate African sponsorship.

South Africa's continued flouting of frequent UN admonitions on its racial policy, plus the increasing reluctance of Afro-Asians to heed Western counsels of moderation, will probably lead to nearly unanimous Afro-Asian support for sanctions. The Japanese UN delegate reports that Tokyo will probably abstain on the Ghanaian draft but believes that most other Asian countries which abstained last year--such as India and Pakistan--will support sanctions this year. The British UN delegate reports that Austria and the Netherlands have decided "for their own political reasons" to abstain rather than vote

against sanctions as they did last year. An Italian UN delegate says his government considers it essential to avoid solid Western European opposition to sanctions as long as a solid African bloc approves such measures.

The General Assembly has never yet recommended sanctions against one of its members. Actual sanctions were recommended against Spain in 1946--Spain did not become a member until 1955--and in 1951 against Communist China. However, on the initiative of its African members, the General Assembly supported the unprecedented censure of South Africa for the hard-hitting speech on 11 October by Foreign Minister Louw during a general debate.

Chinese Representation

The 16th General Assembly is likely to recess in mid-December and resume the session in early spring to complete its heavy agenda. Assembly President Mongi Slim plans to schedule plenary debate on Chinese representation for late November or early December. Ambassador Stevenson comments that scheduling plenary debate so close to the Christmas recess will encourage efforts to have the proposed study committee on the whole problem of Chinese representation report back to the resumed session rather than to the 17th General Assembly

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

Antigovernment rioting that started on 16 October in Ciudad Trujillo and spread to other cities began to slacken after six days, although there was a new outbreak of violence on 25 October in Santiago, the second largest city. According to the American consul general, the rioters are mostly revolutionary-minded youths acting without centralized direction. Student leaders at the university, as well as the directors of the major opposition groups, have taken no public part in the disturbances, and the consul general sees no evidence that they have been clandestinely supporting the rioters. Public sympathy was generally with the rioters at first, but after a few days there were indications that some elements of the public were coming to regard the youths' actions as foolhardy.

The police showed unaccustomed restraint in the early stages of the rioting; even after the clashes became more violent there was not the wholesale bloodshed that probably would have occurred under the old regime. At least four youths were killed, however, and many were injured.

The rioting has probably increased pressure in the armed forces for action against the opposition and possibly, as in the aftermath of civil disturbances last summer, for the replacement of the Balaguer government with a military regime.

At present, however, there is no evidence of plans for an imminent military takeover. The government's replacement of the unpopular university rector, whose appointment had sparked the rioting, may help ease the tension. According to information of 23 October [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] however, many of the students are planning further disorders during the first two weeks of November. 25X1

The government made long-planned moves against the pro-Castro Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) on 22 October but with only partial success. Government press attacks on the MPD and fake MPD rallies staged by government supporters evidently warned most MPD leaders to go into hiding. 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

In an address on 23 October, President Balaguer announced the departure from the country of leading members of the Trujillo family and appealed for an end to political hatreds in "this moment of conciliation and concord." The departure of the two most prominent of the late dictator's brothers, Generals Arismendi and Hector Trujillo, should improve the political climate, but no change in the position of General Ramfis Trujillo appears likely for the immediate future. 25X1

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BOLIVIA

Rioting broke out in La Paz on 21 October as a result of a government decree increasing domestic prices on gasoline and fuel oil. The measure has been recommended by the International Monetary Fund for more than a year as essential to the government's economic stabilization program. President Paz has repeatedly set a date for issuing the decree, only to postpone it as temporarily impossible from a political point of view. The national petroleum company, which provides some export revenue and almost all domestic oil requirements, has been operating at a loss.

The government declared a state of siege in La Paz on the first day of the rioting, imposed domestic press censorship, and reacted to student participation in riots by ending the school year for high schools and universities throughout Bolivia.

Clashes between government supporters and protest mobs apparently led by rightists and extreme leftists occurred on 23 October, despite a prohibition on all demonstrations under the state of siege. The mob destroyed offices of the government newspaper, two police stations, and one gasoline station and attacked other installations. The national committee of the government party has authorized its

members to capture subversives for delivery to the police and to use firearms in defensive action.

The government paper announced on 24 October that some 4,000 members of the rural militia had arrived in La Paz and more were on the way. The rural militia are much feared, particularly by the rightist urban elements who oppose President Paz Estenssoro, who was elected with 70 percent of the vote in June 1960.

The government had evidently been hoping that recent news of political instability would distract public attention from the gasoline price issue. Paz on 19 October had ordered the arrest of a heterogeneous group of rightists and leftists, accusing them of conspiracy against the government.

This was Paz' third major crackdown against his opposition this year; the other two--in February and June--were followed by decrees of a 90-day state of siege throughout the country. While some of the men arrested were probably involved in the revolutionary plotting which is almost constant in Bolivia, opposition groups have not appeared to have a firm plan for overthrowing the government.

The present rioting does not appear to pose any immediate threat to the Paz government, but further violence is likely.

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SECRET**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY****SPECIAL ARTICLES****BACKGROUND OF THE BLOC'S DISPUTE WITH ALBANIA**

East European representatives left the stormy meeting of world Communist leaders in Moscow last November more or less firmly committed to back Khrushchev in his dispute with China and its Adriatic ally. Since then their attitudes toward the Albanians have hardened perceptibly. Khrushchev's stanchest supporters last fall and subsequently have been Poland's Gomulka, East Germany's Ulbricht, and Czechoslovakia's Novotny.

Immediately after the 1960 meeting the European satellite party leaders took steps to forestall any possible opposition within their own countries which might have derived from the compromise at Moscow with the Chinese. They also initiated moves to force Albanian obedience to Moscow. While they apparently succeeded in achieving the former aim, they have thus far failed to accomplish the latter. The Bulgarian regime crushed an "antiparty group" which had Chinese sympathies. East European leaders apparently feared internal party strife of this sort might erupt on a large scale.

All the pro-Moscow satellites have widely publicized their stands against "dogmatism and sectarianism"--that is, Chinese and Albanian policies--although the attack on China appears for the most part to have been left to the Soviets, with the East European parties in a supporting role. In the case of Albania, however, the satellites have joined Moscow in direct attacks. As these attacks continued, bloc unity became only a facade, and Albania now is spoken of privately by East European leaders as "Moscow's Cuba."

Tirana's Behavior

On 18 December 1960 Ulbricht fired the opening shot at Albania when he publicly criticized its position at Moscow. Hoxha answered two weeks later in a public address in which he vowed he would not bow to pressure on "matters of principle." In February 1961, during the Albanian party congress, Hoxha reaffirmed his pro-Chinese attitudes and alluded to the Soviet-backed coup attempt in Albania in the summer of 1960. Hoxha did not directly implicate Moscow, however, charging instead that the US, Greece, and Yugoslavia were behind the move to overthrow him.

Chinese delegates to the Albanian congress received highly preferential treatment over that accorded other bloc delegations. Gomulka, offended by Hoxha's personal attacks on him in Moscow, sent a delegation headed by a party hack and discredited Stalinist, Roman Nowak, who lectured the meeting on the dangers of dogmatism. For this affront, the Polish delegation was snubbed in Tirana, and Polish domestic and foreign policies were attacked on the congress floor.

The Albanians and Chinese have chosen not to participate in a large number of recent bloc scientific and technical conferences. The attendance of both countries--Albania as a full member and China as an observer--at meetings of the bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) has been spotty; they have failed without explanation to appear at a number of CEMA committee sessions they would normally attend.

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Albania's independent attitude was further demonstrated when it sent a delegation which was headed by its defense minister to the Warsaw Pact meeting held in Moscow on 28 and 29 March and attended by the party first secretaries and premiers of all the other East European states.

On 3 April the bloc's clandestine radio beamed at Italy and located in Czechoslovakia quoted in advance of publication an article by Italian Communist party chief Togliatti, who said, "...Questions of internal party life and debate in Albania seemed to us erroneous and dangerous...." Perhaps in reply, Hoxha subsequently announced that a trial of spies and traitors would soon be held--in effect calling for the consummation of the previous summer's purge of pro-Soviet elements. The trial, with transparent anti-Soviet overtones, was held in May, and the chief conspirators were sentenced to death.

During a major policy speech on 6 May, Hoxha again reaffirmed his position and castigated his bloc critics. In an anti-Western portion of his speech he said that Albania could defend itself against aggression, but his choice of words implied a threat from the East as well as the West.

From 3 to 5 August the party chiefs of the Warsaw Pact states met in Moscow to discuss

the Berlin problem. Hoxha sent only a junior party functionary, and China, which holds observer status in the pact, sent no one. Ulbricht viewed the Hoxha representative's rank as a calculated insult and demanded at the first session that he leave; the Albanian returned to Tirana on the following day.

Neither Albania nor China was represented at the 8-9 September meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers in Warsaw--suggesting that those countries no longer participate in pact activities, at least not on the same scale as previously.

Albania was the only European Communist country which sent no special delegate to the celebration of East Germany's 12th anniversary on 7 October. The Albanian ambassador in East Berlin attended the main ceremonies, but he was seated off the platform, away from bloc delegates, and left immediately after the Chinese representative's speech.

Bloc Counteractions

The political friction has affected Tirana's bloc relations in a variety of ways. Polish party First Secretary Gomulka withdrew his ambassador from Albania last March and has since made no move to replace him. In August, the Polish leader accepted a new Albanian ambassador to Warsaw after that post had been vacant for over a year. Members of the Polish Communist party reportedly

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have been forbidden to contact the few Albanian diplomats remaining in Warsaw; apparently, similar restrictions apply to the Poles in Tirana. All news about Albania and China must be cleared with the press department of the Polish party central committee prior to publication.

The Soviet Union decided--apparently in the spring--not to permit Russians to visit Albania. No Czechoslovak or Hungarian tourists have visited Albania in 1961. Fifty Poles made a state-sponsored tour of Albania in May, but Warsaw has canceled all such trips scheduled since then. Tours by bloc nationals to Yugoslavia, Albania's archenemy, still are available for most satellite citizens except East Germans.

The Czechs and the East Germans have withdrawn some of their technicians from Albania. Reportedly all Albanian students in Czechoslovakia returned home in June, and all Czechoslovak higher schools have been ordered to deny admission to Albanian students this fall. Albanian students also left Rumania in June. The Czechs have granted political asylum to two Albanian diplomats in Prague.

Soviet pressure on Hoxha has been continuous. No Soviet representative attended the opening on 1 September of Albanian-Soviet Friendship Month

in Albania--a ceremony which provided the occasion for Tirana's spokesman to reaffirm the "correctness" of his party's line. It has recently become known that the USSR prohibited distribution in the Soviet Union of the Russian-language Novaya Albaniya late last spring. The main Albanian party daily, Zeri i Popullit, and other publications still are available, but only in the Albanian language, which is not widely understood in the USSR. The Zeri i Popullit correspondent in Moscow has been withdrawn, and the Soviet TASS correspondent in Tirana also may have returned home.

Yugoslavia's Role

Yugoslav relations with the USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe have not changed materially because of the Albanian deviation. The bloc regularly criticizes Yugoslav revisionism; the latest condemnation appeared in the new Soviet party program, which all the satellites represented at the current congress in Moscow have joined in approving. Both the USSR and the satellites, however, have continued to maintain state-to-state relations with Belgrade at varying levels of harmony. Despite the lack of any real change in its policy toward Belgrade, Moscow--and occasionally its satellites, particularly Poland--maintains contacts with Yugoslavia in a manner which often suggests that a new Yugoslav-Soviet rapprochement is possible. This tactic

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infuriates the Albanians and Chinese, who regard the Yugoslavs as enemies of Communism.

Both Albania and Communist China, nevertheless, have themselves continued state relations with Yugoslavia, but these relations have at times seemed close to the breaking point. From mid-June to mid-August, however, Albania refrained from its usual propaganda attacks on Yugoslavia.

The Military Situation

Possessing few resources of its own, Albania is dependent on other countries for military aid. In the past, arms and equipment have been supplied by the bloc, especially by the USSR. It is not known whether military equipment is still being furnished by these sources, but one of the major effects of the dispute has been the isolation of Albania in terms of its former military relations with the bloc.

On 26 May the USSR withdrew eight of its W-class submarines which had been based at the Albanian port of Vlone. Subsequently the Soviets reportedly evacuated the naval base entirely. Both Tirana and Moscow have expelled each other's military attachés. The USSR also sent home a group of Albanian naval trainees, and an unknown number of Soviet military experts were expelled from Albania in retaliation.

Economic Relations

Soviet trade with Albania has declined considerably since 1960, but the full extent of the cutback is not known. Some Russian grain is exchanged for Albanian petroleum and mineral raw materials.

East European trade relations with Albania apparently also have been maintained, although on a reduced scale. In return for nickel ore, Czechoslovakia has honored a commitment to aid Albania in the ore's extraction. The Albanians apparently want to do their own refining, however, and have obtained aid from China to establish an ore processing plant in Albania.

China has backed up its ally on the economic as well as the political front. Last February Peiping agreed to supply the Albanians \$125,000,000 in economic assistance over the next five years--after Tirana's request for loans amounting to more than \$160,000,000 (at official exchange rates) had been turned down by the USSR and the European satellites.

Substantial numbers of Chinese technicians have been reported passing through Moscow en route to Tirana. During the year ending June 1961, Albanian grain imports reached a new high of 319,000 metric tons. This is four times more than in previous years; 75 percent of it was supplied by China, itself hard pressed for grain.

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THE CUBAN INTERNAL SITUATION

Domestic dissatisfaction with the Castro regime, springing from the economic and political facts of life in Cuba today, is increasing, but in no case is it believed to have reached a level where a popular revolt seriously threatening the stability of Castro's government is at hand.

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[redacted] in Cuba generally agree that the anti-Castro forces now include more people than ever before from the lower classes--on which the regime depends for its domestic support. The majority of people in this group still support Castro, however, either because they have already benefited more under him than under any previous government, or because they still believe his promises of a materially improved future.

The still-growing numbers in the vast bureaucracy and the militia, dependent on the regime for their livelihood and social status, furnish another important source of support. The regime maintains a hard core of fanatical backers and a large and efficient apparatus of repression.

The Opposition Forces

Opposition activity virtually stopped after the mid-April landings and the regime's intense campaign of terror against all known or suspected dissidents. Several small guerrilla bands are still operating on the island, however, and there is evidence that acts of sabotage are again occurring sporadically and that individuals or small groups of government troops continue to desert to the anti-Castro forces.

For the most part, however, the active opposition is still handicapped by factionalism and a lack of organization, a shortage of supplies, the absence of a strong leader with Castro's appeal, and the need for a well-defined substitute for the Castro program. The chances of effective military action against Castro are constantly fading, while he continues to build up well-equipped, well-trained military and other security forces.

Public Discontent

Of more significance in the long run are the numerous indications of increasing discontent and disillusionment among the public. The people are beginning to express their unhappiness with the degree of regimentation imposed on them, and regime leaders are publicly decrying worker absenteeism.

Popular resentment flared into open demonstrations in Havana and several other Cuban cities in September when the government banned a religious procession and was forced for the first time to resort to firearms to disperse the rioters. The historically weak position of the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba and Castro's expulsion of more than half of Cuba's clergymen make it unlikely that further major religious demonstrations will occur.

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[redacted] that grumbling over shortages of food and other items is becoming louder and more widespread. There is no evidence, however, that Cubans are starving or that shortages of lard,

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meat, rice, and other products basic to the Cuban diet will become severe enough to encourage a revolt. The continuing delivery to Cuba of foodstuffs and other vital consumer goods from the bloc, plus an anticipated increase in domestic food production as scientific growing methods are enforced under the state-directed long-range economic plan, should prevent current shortages from assuming critical proportions.

Refugee Flights

The flow of Cubans leaving the island--some by legal means and a greater number by extra-legal means--has increased within the past few months. By August some 700 Cubans had taken diplomatic asylum in several Latin American embassies in Havana; only recently has the regime begun to permit some of these persons to leave Cuba. More than 15,000 Cubans with travel arrangements completed were reported by the US press to have been affected by the government's mid-September measure requiring new travel documentation. The number of Cubans leaving the island clandestinely--usually by means of small, ill-equipped boats--has risen since last spring.

Regime Reaction

Castro and his lieutenants are reacting strongly to manifestations of unrest. "Revolutionary tribunals" have intensified their activities, and firing squads executed at least 26 persons in September alone, according to press reports. Military units in Oriente and Camaguey provinces were placed on alert in early October, and other general mobilization measures were reported on the 17th.

Cuban officials and propaganda media have intensified their violent anti-US campaign, charging that the United States is preparing "a new, larger invasion." This campaign may stem from a real fear of invasion. It is also probably designed to divert public attention from local economic and political problems--a tactic Castro has used in the past. It may also presage a Castro effort to discredit the United States by staging a faked landing in advance of any OAS consideration of the Cuban problem.

New Security Measures

The various measures taken by the regime up to last April to tighten internal security under the guise of temporary expedients have since that time become increasingly institutionalized and have assumed the character of permanent instruments of internal control. The most pervasive of these, the Revolutionary Defense Committees, comprise a nationwide informant network controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The goal, announced on 30 April, of 100,000 committees throughout the country comprising 500,000 "revolutionary vigilantes" has, according to government announcements in early autumn, been substantially accomplished.

In early June, the regime's secret police organization was transferred to a re-organized Ministry of Interior. This change probably resulted in a more efficient and centralized internal security apparatus and also in effective Communist control of this function. Ramiro Valdes, a Communist, rose from chief of the old G-2 to head of the new ministry.

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Simultaneous with the increased efficiency of the internal security apparatus has been the development of a concerted indoctrination program described by regime leaders as a campaign to eradicate illiteracy from the nation before the end of this year and now frankly characterized by them as based on "Marxist-Leninist principles."

Party, Government Reorganization

The political and organizational structure of the state is also rapidly evolving toward a system similar to the party and governmental structure found in the Soviet bloc. The old provincial and municipal governments are being replaced by Boards for Coordination, Execution, and Inspection (JUCEI). JUCEI have been formed since last June in all six provinces, and subordinate ones have been set up or are in the process of formation in the municipalities. Local and provincial JUCEI are subordinate to a national group headed by Fidel Castro called the JUCEPLAN.

The prototype JUCEI was formed in Oriente Province last spring under the direction of Raul Castro. According to a speech on 4 June by the younger Castro, it consists of a "provincial congress," a 1,200-member body which is to convene "two or three times a year"; a "plenum"--i.e., the provincial board--which meets every few months; and other units, which meet very frequently. Membership is theoretically representative of all major economic entities in the territory of responsibility.

The frequent references to JUCEI units in the Cuban press, however, indicate that their members are drawn exclusively or almost exclusively from the ranks of the political machine the regime now is organizing.

In his 4 June speech, Raul Castro described the JUCEI as "instruments for applying plans" at the local level which had been decided upon by higher authority. "Building socialism without planning is impossible," he said, "and contrasts with the anarchy of the capitalist economy." Cuban Communist leader Blas Roca described the JUCEI on 14 August as "a new form of state power, a step forward in the procedure we are following for the direct establishment of the power of the people over all the country."

Cells of the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (ORI), the parallel party machine now also emerging, are being organized throughout the country as the first phase of an entity that is to be called the United party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution. Communist Secretary General Blas Roca has been the leading spokesman for and advocate of the new political organization. His public statements foreshadow a party system in which membership will be limited to the elite of the revolutionary struggle but will, in turn, be a requisite to holding any positions of economic or political importance in the country. It is clear from the statements of ORI leaders that the new party is to be controlled by the Communists and based on "Marxist-Leninist principles."

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In his talks next month with President Kennedy, Jawaharlal Nehru will be eager to explore international problems, but the line he takes on cold war issues is likely to be based firmly on the neutralist policy he has always felt best served India's national interest. The Indian leader's emphasis on negotiation and compromise as essential to ease cold war tensions stems largely from his fear that war--even if localized--would jeopardize what chance India has of attaining a reasonable level of economic development.

Nehru, who will arrive on 5 November, has visited the United States on three previous occasions (1949, 1956, and 1960) during his 14 years as India's prime minister.

The Record at Home

Nehru will be 72 on 14 November. His power and presence remains basically undiminished. While close associates report that the prime minister is slowing down and that his grip on the government and party has loosened, he still shows remarkable vitality and command of affairs, large and small.

As Nehru surveys the state of the Indian Union today, he probably feels reasonable satisfaction over the country's relative stability and steady, if unspectacular, economic progress. The over-all picture, as the Third Five-Year Plan gets underway and the third national elections draw near, looks considerably brighter than at various times of crisis in the 1950s. Those who have traveled in India recently have sensed a new

"stirring" throughout the country as the pace of economic growth quickens and popular interest is stimulated.

Building on the modest but substantial achievements of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, New Delhi's planners have set ambitious targets for the "bold and big" Third Plan (1961-66) in hopes of raising national income by 25 percent. In contrast to the uncertainty of previous years, New Delhi this spring received a tentative commitment from the consortium of Western nations and the World Bank--the "Aid-India Club"--to furnish nearly \$2 billion in aid for the first two years of the plan, and in addition has assurances of substantial assistance from Moscow. Total foreign exchange requirements for the plan period are estimated at nearly \$6 billion.

India's chronic food shortage has been eased by the increase in annual food production of more than 35 percent during the First and Second Plans, as well as by large-scale imports of US surplus foods. Barring major weather calamities, the increasing yields and build-up of reserve stocks should provide a basis for further progress in overcoming this old problem.

Nehru can also look ahead to the national elections in February with reasonable expectation that his Congress party will be returned with a comfortable majority in Parliament and safe margins in most state assemblies. Congress majorities may be reduced in some cases, but no opposition party--especially on the left--appears capable

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yet of seriously threatening the ruling party's dominant position nationally.

The weakened Communists may manage to hold on to their 10-percent share of the popular vote but have little hope of improving their position; the socialists face eclipse. A right-of-center Hindu nationalist party--the Jana Sangh--appears to have picked up strength in certain areas recently, but probably will place well behind the Congress party nationally. The conservative Swatantra (Freedom) party, founded in 1959 with strong backing from Indian private enterprise, has attracted little mass support and seems unlikely to improve its position significantly.

Problems of Leadership

Major problems remain for Nehru, however. The outlook for a successor to him and the prospect of an orderly transfer of power in the Congress high command have become obscured in 1961. The death of Home Minister Pant last March deprived Nehru of his chief deputy in government and party and one of his few remaining close associates among the old guard. The subsequent maneuvering for the office of deputy party leader--which has been called "the first war of the succession"--was halted for the time being in August when Nehru created two posts of deputy leader, neither of which has yet been filled.

Nehru has always found it distasteful to think of an heir, and he does not favor any of the remaining most likely candi-

dates. He particularly distrusts the preponderant conservative clique led by 65-year-old Finance Minister Morarji Desai. Nehru thus limits his moves to checkmating all contenders, maintaining that a new national leader must not be chosen but must emerge spontaneously through mass support. Desai's premature bid for formal designation as deputy has damaged his prestige and caused disparate elements in the high command to join forces against him, but he retains his place as second-ranking cabinet minister.

The unhealthy condition of the Congress organization, particularly at the provincial level, casts increasing doubt on the party's ability to maintain its predominant position without the vast mass appeal of Nehru's leadership. Efforts by the Congress high command to rid the organization of chronic factional strife, lethargy, corruption, and casteism have had little effect. The party's power now is derived less from vital leadership and mass support than from the wealth, social leverage, and authoritarian controls it commands.

Among India's internal problems, the old question of national unity seems to fill Nehru with the greatest personal sense of frustration and foreboding. His struggle against regional, linguistic, caste, and especially religious differences dates even farther back than his fight for Indian independence. The militant agitation for linguistic and regional autonomy which developed in many areas of India during the 1950s, added to the historic tension between North and South, raised serious

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questions about the durability of India's unity. The recent resurgence of communal sentiment, pitting Hindu against Moslem and Sikh, challenges Nehru's basic purpose of achieving a secular society and endangers the stability he has maintained since 1947.

In the economic field, Nehru knows that despite its progress India has a long way to go before it is "over the hump." Such growing problems as unemployment, inflation, and scarcity of industrial power give considerable cause for concern. Nehru feels that there may be just time to get India's economic development to the "take-off" stage before the crushing pressure of an expanding population makes it a futile exercise.

Nehru and the World

Nehru's life-long interest in international affairs has developed notions of the world beyond India which are fairly fixed. His frequent preoccupation with foreign affairs and his "meddling" in international problems have generally been misconstrued as representing merely the personal traits of Nehru the man and his desire to play the role of international arbiter; the prime concerns, however, which have motivated Nehru's career are directly related to India and its development. The positions he takes in his official role usually conform to a consistent policy line, the sole test of which is India's national interest. Moral or humanitarian considerations are subordinated.

This premium on national interest provides a key to the rationale behind India's position on major cold war issues, and helps explain why New Delhi acts, or fails to act, as it does. Nehru is haunted by a fear that the cold war will turn hot, resulting in global economic dislocation that would bring India's economic progress to a halt. Thus, to reduce tension between the major powers, whatever its cause, becomes New Delhi's paramount need and objective, and this often overrides questions of principle, consistency, and legal right.

Nehru repeatedly calls for negotiations as the first step toward a compromise solution which will solve or at least cool a crisis. Since he feels nothing should be done to harden attitudes and thus raise tensions, he will carefully avoid making public judgments as to which party is right and resist pressure for India to join internationally in formal findings of guilt. This accounts in large part for Nehru's reluctance in public to go beyond expressions of "regret" over Soviet repression in Hungary, Khrushchev's heavyhandedness at the UN, and Moscow's resumption of nuclear tests.

In seeking to influence the big powers to compromise, Nehru pragmatically tends to work hardest on the side he thinks most likely to make concessions, without regard to the merits of either position. The West often gets the brunt of his pressure and criticism because, in the manner of a sympathetic

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colleague, he expects Western leaders to be more tractable and reasonable than the "boorish" Bolsheviks. He is likely to concentrate his efforts elsewhere only when he is convinced that a position is not negotiable and that a settlement can result only from concessions from the other side.

It should be noted that New Delhi has other reasons for not wishing to antagonize the Soviet Government unduly. Nehru feels the huge Third Plan will need all the credits he can get from the USSR. He also feels he cannot afford to risk losing Moscow's support on the Kashmir question.

The Policy in Practice

Nehru's dread of cold war confrontations and his efforts at conciliation are illustrated in India's approach to Berlin, Laos, the Congo, disarmament, and the United Nations. Like many Indians, Nehru lacks a clear understanding of the German question and appreciation of what is at stake. He is less concerned with legal rights than with negotiations, compromise formulas, and a settlement based on present "realities" in which the interests of neither side are seriously damaged.

In Laos and Vietnam, Nehru sees India's role as chairman of the International Control Commission as one of neutralizing and obstructing big-power intervention, rather than one of investigating impartially and fixing guilt without regard to possible reactions. For similar reasons, Nehru was willing to abandon Indian precedent

and give military support to the UN operation in the Congo. He estimated that only by interposing the UN between the opposing factions could either cold war power be prevented from gaining a decisive advantage and a direct clash be averted. Rajeshwar Dayal, like Krishna Menon in the UN or at Geneva, frequently carried the balancing act well beyond Nehru's general instructions.

Regional Problems

National interest dictates a different policy when meeting a threat affecting India directly. India readily assumes the role of a big power in neighboring Nepal, where privately it feels intervention is justified in India's defense. In its border dispute with Communist China, New Delhi places prime importance on the legal rights it minimizes elsewhere, and stiffly rejects Peiping's bids to negotiate a compromise.

Similarly, in India's dispute with Pakistan over the Kashmir question, the Indian prime minister leans heavily on legalities, has repeatedly turned down offers to negotiate, and refuses to compromise. Nehru clearly feels that his country's interests are best served by maintaining the status quo, which leaves India with the lion's share of the disputed territory. Moreover, with the elections approaching and Hindu-Moslem tensions rising, Prime Minister Nehru cannot afford to show any weakness on this issue.

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